The SEA Storm: How History and Politics Collided on the Thailand-Cambodia Border
- Johnson Odakkal

- 3 days ago
- 10 min read
Another Episode of “Global Canvas” from JOI
It is often said that the SEA is prone to turbulence, its waters unpredictable and wild. It has yet again flared up, however, this time, the storm is not stirred by nature, but by power politics. This “SEA” is not made of water, but years of historical ties, entangled alliances, and complex politics. This is the story of two South East Asian (SEA) nations, Thailand and Cambodia, caught once again in the eye of a political storm.
Rich cultural legacies define South East Asia’s identity and tourism economies. Ironically, this shared heritage is the very reason that Thailand and Cambodia have repeatedly exchanged artillery fire and airstrikes over the years. Beneath the surface, an old border dispute has simmered since the early 1900s, waiting for another political ignition point.

Context and Background
To trace this conflict, the story returns to 1904. That year, the Kingdom of Siam (present-day Thailand) signed a border agreement with France, which then ruled Cambodia as a colony. The region was filled with dense forests and sharp mountain gradients. Both sides agreed the border would follow the Dangrek Mountains’ watershed line, though the exact demarcation remained unclear.
The narrative shifted in 1907 when France produced the “Annex I” map, placing the Prasat Preah Vihear temple (known as Phra Viharn in Thailand) inside Cambodian territory. This map deviated from the watershed principle. Preah Vihear is a Hindu temple dedicated to God Shiva, constructed by the Khmer Empire during the 11th-12th centuries. Over time, it also reflected Buddhist influence. Its location atop a steep escarpment made it both architecturally majestic and politically sensitive.
As the Khmer Empire declined, parts of the region periodically fell under Siamese control, especially after Siam’s attack on Angkor Thom. Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1863 to avoid Siamese dominance. In 1867, Siam renounced several territorial claims, including those around Preah Vihear.
The 1907 map soon became controversial. Critics argued that France had ignored the 1904 agreement’s requirement for a joint survey. Instead, France surveyed and published the maps unilaterally in Paris. If the watershed principle had been applied as agreed, Siamese officials argued, most of the Preah Vihear temple would have fallen on the Siamese side. Yet Siam did not submit an official objection. This silence later became central to Cambodia’s legal argument.
The story resurfaced in the Second World War. In 1941, Thailand used France’s weakened position to seize the area. Japan mediated an end to the conflict, leading to the Franco-Siamese Peace Convention. After Japan’s defeat, the treaty became void. The 1946 settlement returned the territory to French control. When France withdrew following Cambodian independence, Thailand reoccupied the temple. Cambodia took the dispute to the International Court of Justice in 1959.
Thailand argued that the 1907 map was not legally binding. The ICJ, however, noted that Thailand had not objected when the map was presented. The Court also pointed out that in 1930, Thai Prince Damrong had visited the temple, seen the French-Cambodian flag, and raised no protest. This counted as tacit acceptance.
In 1962, the ICJ ruled in Cambodia’s favour. Thailand withdrew troops the following year. Prince Sihanouk sought to ease tensions by allowing Thai visitors to enter the temple without visas and even permitted Thailand to retain certain relics taken during its occupation. Yet the underlying border was never fully resolved. The ICJ ruled only on the temple, not the surrounding 4.6 square kilometres. Thailand continues to reject ICJ authority over this disputed area.
The conflict returned dramatically in 2008 when Cambodia submitted Preah Vihear for UNESCO World Heritage status. Thailand objected, arguing the application involved disputed land. Political tempers flared.
In Thailand, the People’s Alliance for Democracy, the “Yellow Shirts” (backed by monarchy, military, and urban elites), accused the government of surrendering sovereignty. On the other side of the border, in Cambodia, Hun Sen amplified nationalist sentiment before elections. UNESCO eventually approved Cambodia’s submission, triggering troop deployments and clashes.
Between 2013 and 2023, tensions ebbed but never ended. They resurfaced during negotiations over the Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand, believed to hold oil and gas. Initial diplomatic warmth between Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Hun Manet created hope. However, conservative Thai factions accused Paetongtarn of risking territorial concessions. Cambodian nationalists revived their own claims. Both sides hardened their positions.
The spark came from a viral video in February 2025 showing Cambodians singing their national anthem at Ta Muen Thom, located in Thailand’s Surin province. This temple, too, became a point of contention due to its historical ties to the Khmer Empire. A Joint Border Commission meeting collapsed in June. Days later, Hun Sen leaked a private call with Paetongtarn, referring to him as “uncle”, humiliating Thai leadership. Paetongtarn was suspended by Thailand’s Constitutional Court on July 1.
Meanwhile, both militaries fortified their borders. Analysts noted new roads and outposts on both sides. Apologies between commanders in April were followed by gunfire in May that killed a Cambodian soldier. On July 23, 2025 a Thai soldier lost a leg to a landmine, triggering full-scale clashes the next day. Cambodia fired BM-21 rockets. Thailand responded with F-16 strikes. More than 30 people were killed, and over 200,000 displaced.
Efforts at peace repeatedly collapsed. A temporary halt to fighting was agreed on July 28 in Malaysia. Yet, within hours Thailand accused Cambodia of violating the truce. Another meeting in Shanghai followed. A thirteen-point plan to demilitarize the Preah Vihear area was drafted. Hopes peaked when both sides signed the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords at an ASEAN summit on October 26, 2025, in the presence of President Donald Trump and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. The agreement included releasing prisoners of war, removing heavy weapons, clearing landmines, and deploying neutral observers.
However, the peace barely lasted two weeks. An explosion in November wounded four Thai soldiers. Thailand suspended the ceasefire on November 10. More clashes followed. Thailand cancelled prisoner releases. On November 17, Thailand presented evidence of newly planted mines. Cambodia denied responsibility. By late November, neither side had an incentive to step back. Fighting flared up in December 2025, with the bordering areas yet again witnessing the horrors of artillery, rockets, airstrikes, and drones, causing casualties. Tens of thousands more civilians have been displaced, and both governments are trading accusations of ceasefire violations and foreign interference. What began as a “temporary truce” has reverted to open confrontation, confirming once again that negative peace without structural reconciliation is no peace at all.

Key Players and Stakeholders
Thailand and Cambodia Governments. Both governments faced domestic pressure that constrained their ability to compromise. In Thailand, conservative factions and the military leveraged nationalist sentiment. Paetongtarn Shinawatra was suspended by the Constitutional Court following a leaked phone call with Hun Manet’s father, former Prime Minister Hun Sen. In Cambodia, rising nationalism and Hun Manet’s political consolidation reinforced hardline positions.
Military and Security Forces. Both armies fortified positions, built roads, and deployed forces near disputed temples and border sites such as Hill-641 and Chong Bok. Cambodia’s army constructed at least nine new roads and positions near the tri-junction of Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos. Thailand responded with infrastructure upgrades near Prasat Ta Muen Thom. Gunfire, artillery exchanges, and airstrikes caused casualties, injuries, and mass displacement.
Civilians. Women, children, and local communities were disproportionately affected. Artillery fire, landmines, and forced evacuations disrupted livelihoods, education, and social cohesion. Human security concerns became central to understanding the cost of militarisation.
Criminal and Transnational Actors. The Golden Triangle cyber-scam crisis added tension. Criminal networks, displaced by Chinese enforcement, migrated to border regions, heightening suspicion between Thailand and Cambodia and complicating security operations.
ASEAN, International Courts, and UNESCO. Regional institutions attempted mediation, but non-interference principles and limited enforcement capacity constrained effectiveness. The ICJ, UNESCO, and other international frameworks shaped the legal backdrop but could not prevent escalation.
Major Concerns and Consequences
The Golden Triangle became the centre of cyber-scam syndicates after the 2021 Myanmar coup. Criminal groups ran scam centres using kidnapped workers. When Chinese actor Wang Xing was trafficked to a Myanmar scam camp in January 2025, China mounted a major crackdown, forcing syndicates to disperse into Laos and Cambodia. China pressured Thailand to cut electricity and internet at the border, heightening tensions.
Thai and Cambodian leaders already mistrusted each other. Hun Sen’s leak worsened the situation leading to an increase in troop movements. Though ceasing conflict and ensuring safety of its citizens should be the penultimate goal of states, the realist lens shows an unfortunate tale. As Hagir Elsheikh, in her work “Dreamer in Chains: Poems of Exile and Resilience,” quoted, Greed fuels war, for war is profitable. As long as there are profits, peace is but a fable, this conflict too tends to profit certain factions on both sides. For Thailand's military, it could be beneficial in strengthening their political position ahead of the March 2026 parliamentary election. This could hinder the progressive People's Party's chances of winning an outright majority. Cambodian leadership, on the other hand, also focuses on maintenance of power through nationalistic narratives. Many observers argue that Hun Sen escalated tensions to protect the shadow economies of cybercrime and casinos, or to bolster Hun Manet’s legitimacy. Additionally, Phnom Penh is hesitant to back down due to public outrage over the ceasefire collapse and pressure to appear strong. Cambodia has grown closer to the U.S., which might influence their strategy. However, Thailand remains a key U.S. treaty ally and trading partner, complicating Cambodia's position.
Hence, the Thailand-Cambodia conflict demonstrates that legal adjudication and heritage recognition alone cannot resolve historical disputes. Post-colonial boundaries remain fragile, and structural ambiguities create recurring crises. Repeated escalations threaten regional stability, economic development, and civilian welfare. Nationalist mobilisation around cultural symbols can weaponise heritage, while political and military incentives reinforce the cycle of tension.
Until inclusive dialogue, political courage, and credible regional mechanisms address historical grievances, the border will remain a recurring flashpoint. The conflict is a reminder that unresolved pasts continue to shape the present and that regional peace requires attention to both material and symbolic dimensions of sovereignty.


Political Perspectives and Understanding
Realism explains why both states rely on force to defend sovereignty in an anarchic regional system with weak enforcement mechanisms. Security dilemmas intensify when military posturing appears necessary to deter perceived threats. Constructivism illuminates the role of identity, memory, and symbolism. Temples and historical sites are not neutral; they embody civilisational pride and historical grievance. Compromise is framed as betrayal, and national narratives reinforce existential stakes.
Structural power perspectives show the uneven influence of institutions. ICJ rulings, UNESCO heritage status, and colonial treaties constrain state behavior but also inflame domestic politics. Human security frameworks highlight the civilian cost of militarisation. Diversionary incentives suggest leaders may exploit external conflict to consolidate legitimacy, though evidence is contested.
Domestic politics significantly shape escalation. In Cambodia, Hun Manet’s political consolidation and nationalist sentiment limited compromise. In Thailand, the military leveraged heightened nationalism ahead of elections, weakening progressive forces. Both governments faced political incentives to avoid appearing weak, making de-escalation difficult. Regional and global alliances, particularly U.S. involvement and ASEAN constraints, also shaped strategic calculations.
Johan Galtung’s concepts of negative and positive peace help explain the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict. Here, ceasefire represented negative peace i.e., a temporary halt to direct violence, but one that ignores root causes. This leads to repeated backsliding as borders stay militarized, nationalist narratives fester in schools and media, and economic disparities (e.g., unequal Gulf of Thailand resources) breed resentment. For lasting stability, positive peace is essential. This calls for addressing structural violence through justice and integration. Initiatives could include joint cultural programs at Preah Vihear (shared tourism revenue), cross-border economic zones, or truth-and-reconciliation commissions on colonial legacies. Yet, ASEAN's non-interference often favors the former, dodging mediation on history. True progress demands courage, in the form of demilitarizing mindsets via youth exchanges or UNESCO collaborations. Without it, triggers like elections or leaks will keep the cycle spinning, as temples symbolize not just stone, but unresolved identities.
Takeaways
The 2025 Thailand-Cambodia border clashes are not isolated skirmishes, but symptoms of deeper structural issues. Civilians bear the immediate cost, while domestic political pressures and nationalist narratives constrain compromise. Realist, constructivist, and human security perspectives illuminate the persistence of conflict, showing that both identity and power shape escalation. ASEAN and international mechanisms can moderate but not resolve disputes without political will. This conflict underscores that borders, history, and culture are intertwined in regional security, and unresolved disputes will repeatedly resurface until addressed holistically. Thus, the storm in the SEA has not passed. It continues to churn.
Compiled by Commodore (Dr) Johnson Odakkal (with support from Ms. Kashmira Juwatkar & Ms. Supriya Mishra)
Stay Tuned for More!
Thailand and Cambodia’s ongoing dispute highlights that borders are more than lines on a map. They are living sites of history, identity, and political negotiation. Future editions of Global Canvas will continue to track how unresolved historical grievances shape modern geopolitics in Southeast Asia and beyond. What movement or global trend should we map next? Share your thoughts, reflections and questions in the comments. Stay connected with us through www.johnsonodakkal.com or email us at ceo@johnsonodakkal.com
Exciting news related to the Global Canvas series coming soon! Watch out for updates!
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