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Syria in Transition: The Unfinished Revolution

Another Episode of “Global Canvas” from JOI

For more than a decade, Syria existed in the margins of time. Not paused, not moving forward, but held in a quiet tension between what had been lost and what refused to disappear. Streets carried the weight of memory, homes stood as witnesses rather than shelters, and survival became an act of routine rather than hope. From a distance, the world learned to accept this permanence, mistaking endurance for stability and silence for resolution.


Over years, Syria occupied the global imagination as a conflict frozen in time. Ruined cities, fractured borders, and a population exhausted by war came to symbolise a crisis that seemed immune to resolution. Diplomats spoke of managed decline, and the international community adjusted to the belief that the Assad regime, for all its brutality, would endure. What persisted instead was a sense of suspended collapse, a state that had ceased to function meaningfully yet continued to exist through inertia and the backing of external patrons.


That illusion shattered in December 2024. The fall of Damascus on 8 December unfolded quietly, without triumphant crowds or ceremonial resignations. It marked not a dramatic overthrow but the final implosion of a system long hollowed out from within. What Syrians had sensed for years, the world witnessed in real time: a powerful façade masking a decaying core.



Context and Background


Few collapses in contemporary political history have been as swift or disorienting. A state that had survived thirteen years of civil war, foreign intervention, and insurgent offensives disintegrated in barely twelve days. This speed was not accidental. It reflected the dynamics of what has been described as a hollow state, one that preserves the appearance of sovereignty even as coercive capacity and internal legitimacy steadily erode.


By late 2024, these fractures converged. Russia’s military overstretch in Ukraine depleted the air power that had once shielded Damascus. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps faced mounting pressures across Iraq, Lebanon, and the Red Sea. Hezbollah, weakened by sustained Israeli operations, could no longer offer decisive support. Inside Syria, Assad’s security apparatus was exhausted. Soldiers went unpaid, checkpoints operated as personal fiefdoms, and Baathist rhetoric rooted in nationalism and resistance no longer resonated with a population battered by deprivation.


The final blow came on 27 November 2024, when Hayat Tahrir al Sham launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression from Idlib. Its fighters encountered a Syrian Arab Army unwilling to defend the capital. Damascus fell with startling ease, and Assad fled to Moscow the same afternoon. His departure confirmed what had long been evident: the regime had collapsed internally long before it collapsed territorially.


Key Players and Stakeholders

Ahmed al Sharaa and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). At the centre of Syria’s transition is Ahmed al Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al Julani. Once an al Qaeda linked insurgent with a United States bounty on his head, he emerged as the most coherent political actor in a fragmented post Assad landscape. After severing formal ties with al Qaeda in 2016 and rebranding his movement as HTS in 2017, he governed Idlib through a tightly controlled system combining strict security enforcement with selective, image conscious reforms. In March 2025, he signed a Constitutional Declaration suspending the 2012 constitution and establishing a five year transitional presidency. Later that year, his appearance at the White House alongside President Donald Trump symbolised the political recalibration shaping Syria’s new order.

The Transitional Syrian Leadership Structure. The governing framework introduced after Assad’s fall centralises authority around the presidency. The 2025 Constitutional Declaration grants the executive sweeping powers over ministerial appointments, parliamentary dissolution, legislative nominations, and judicial selection. This structure defines the nature of political authority during the transition and shapes the balance between consolidation and inclusion.


Turkey. Turkey plays an indispensable role in Syria’s transition. Hosting nearly three million Syrian refugees and deeply wary of Kurdish autonomy along its border, Ankara views a cooperative government in Damascus as central to its security architecture. Turkey provided critical logistical and political support during the 2024 offensive and now exerts influence across administrative and military sectors in northern Syria. The relationship reflects converging interests between border security, refugee management, and political stabilisation.


The United States. The United States has recalibrated its approach following Assad’s collapse. After years of sanctions and conditional engagement, Washington began viewing al Sharaa as a potential counterweight to Iranian regional networks. In early 2025, Caesar Act sanctions were partially waived and HTS was removed from the terrorist designation list. This shift reflected adaptation to changing geopolitical realities rather than ideological endorsement.


Russia and Iran. Russia and Iran, once dominant actors in Syrian affairs, now occupy diminished positions. Moscow retains its military bases at Tartus and Hmeimim but lacks the leverage it once exercised. Iran’s land corridor to Lebanon has been disrupted, and allied militias face new vulnerabilities. Syria’s transition underscores the limits of external patronage when internal legitimacy erodes.


Minority Communities and Territorial Authorities. Syria’s minority communities remain central stakeholders in the transition. Alawites, long associated with Assad’s security apparatus, face fear and reprisals. Christians remain apprehensive despite public assurances of protection. Druze communities in Suwayda assert local autonomy. Kurdish authorities administer the northeast and remain cautious of a constitutional framework hostile to federalism and autonomy.


Major Concerns and Consequences

Minority Vulnerability and Reprisals. The collapse of the Assad regime intensified insecurity among minority communities. Alawites faced widespread fear of retribution, with reports indicating more than 1,500 deaths during March 2025 alone. Christians continued to express anxiety despite official protection guarantees, reinforcing communal mistrust and withdrawal.

The Kurdish Question. Although the Syrian Democratic Forces signed a provisional integration agreement in March 2025, implementation stalled. Kurdish leadership recognised that the new constitutional order is fundamentally hostile to federalism and autonomy. This unresolved tension remains one of the most volatile aspects of Syria’s transition.


Executive Concentration of Power. The 2025 Constitutional Declaration established an executive presidency with extensive authority. The president can appoint ministers, dissolve parliament, nominate one third of the legislature, and select all members of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Laws criminalising glorification of the former regime enabled widespread detentions, particularly in Alawite regions. These measures raised concerns that the post Assad order mirrors the centralised authoritarianism of the past.


Persistent Territorial Fragmentation. Despite regime change, Syria remains territorially divided. Sunni majority urban centres fall under transitional control. Alawite militias retain coastal strongholds. Kurdish authorities govern the resource rich northeast. Druze communities maintain local autonomy. These divisions reflect long standing historical, sectarian, and political fractures.


Unresolved Transitional Justice. With more than half a million dead and countless disappeared, demands for accountability remain deeply embedded in Syrian society. The transitional leadership prioritised stability, integrating defected regime officials, releasing select detainees, and avoiding broad institutional reforms. This approach preserved unresolved grievances that originally fuelled the 2011 uprising.


Structural Fragility of the Transition. The interaction of centralised authority, territorial fragmentation, minority insecurity, and deferred justice defines Syria’s post Assad political landscape. The transition reflects not closure but continuity of unresolved tensions embedded within a reconfigured power structure.


Political Perspectives and Understanding

Syria’s transition invites deeper theoretical reflection. Constructivism helps explain al Sharaa’s transformation from insurgent commander to transitional president as a recalibration of political identity. Changes in rhetoric, appearance, and diplomatic posture enabled him to project legitimacy at home and acceptability abroad. External actors, fatigued by conflict, accepted this constructed identity because it aligned with their strategic aims.

Neorealism adds another layer. States adjusted to shifting power balances in ways that maximised security interests. Turkey aligned with HTS to manage border threats. The United States recalibrated to counter Iran. Russia and Iran receded under structural constraints. Within Syria, Barry Posen’s domestic security dilemma explains why minorities retain arms and why the central government interprets such actions as sedition. Mutual fear sustains militarisation and instability.


More broadly, concepts of sovereignty, legitimacy, recognition, and state failure are being reconfigured. Authority in post Assad Syria is constructed through control, narrative, and external recognition rather than inherited institutions. The selective re engagement of the United States underscores how recognition functions as a geopolitical instrument rather than a moral judgment.


Takeaways

Syria’s transition illustrates that the fall of a regime does not automatically produce democratic renewal. It reveals how revolutions can end not in liberation but in the reconfiguration of power under new terms. The decline of Russian and Iranian influence, the resurgence of Turkish engagement, and the pragmatic acceptance of a former al Qaeda figure by the United States reflect a broader shift toward realpolitik over ideological consistency.


For Syrians, the central question remains unresolved. Has the revolution delivered transformation, or merely exchanged one form of authoritarianism for another? The answer will depend on whether the new leadership can build trust with minorities, negotiate a sustainable settlement with the Kurds, and restrain its own impulses toward hyper centralisation.


Compiled by Commodore (Dr) Johnson Odakkal (with support from Ms. Supriya Mishra & Ms. Kashmira Juwatkar) 

Stay Tuned for More!

Syria’s transition reminds us that revolutions are not clean endings but prolonged negotiations with history, power, and fear. The fall of Assad closed one chapter, yet it opened another defined by fragile authority, contested legitimacy, and unresolved questions of justice and inclusion. As Syria navigates this uncertain transition, the balance between stability and accountability will shape whether it moves toward renewal or repeats familiar cycles of authoritarian control.

Global Canvas will continue to trace how unfinished revolutions reshape regional orders and redefine global political norms. Which transition or geopolitical shift should we map next? Stay connected with us through www.johnsonodakkal.com or email us at ceo@johnsonodakkal.com


Exciting news related to the Global Canvas series coming soon! Watch out for updates!

References and Sources



  • Lister, C. (2024). The Syrian jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the evolution of an insurgency. Oxford University Press.


  • Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. W.W. Norton.




















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